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Two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial
crisis. First, more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the U.S. nonfinancial sectors since the mid
1980s has been financed by foreign lending. Second, the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage-
backed-securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset markets. Using an
open-economy model where financial intermediaries play a central role, we show that financial integration
leads to a sharp rise in net credit in the most financially developed country and leads to large asset price
spillovers of country-specific shocks to bank capital. The impact of these shocks on asset prices are
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The global nancial crisis that started with the meltdown of the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage market in 2007 was preceded by a twenty-year period of
substantial growth in debt and leverages, in an environment of increasing
world nancial integration, low real interest rates and growing U.S. external
decits. During this period of widening \global imbalances" we also observed
several nancial crises in emerging economies with cross-country contagion
that in some cases did not appear driven by fundamentals. Some of these
crises aected the capital markets of the industrial world (particularly the
LTCM crisis in the aftermath of the 1998 Russian crash).
These events have generated a large body of research with well-established
contributions. Until now, however, the study of global imbalances and the
study of nancial crises and contagion have remained somewhat separate sub-
jects. In contrast, this paper addresses the question of whether the ongoing
global nancial crisis and the process of nancial globalization are related. In
particular, we study two issues. First, whether nancial globalization con-
tributed to the buildup of high leverages in some industrialized countries,
especially the U.S. Second, whether credit frictions amplify the eects of
shocks to the balance sheet of banks and how these eects are transmitted
across countries.
The motivation for this paper derives from the evidence provided in Figure
1 according to which the U.S. credit boom was largely fueled by foreign
lending.
1. The rst panel of Figure 1 shows that the net debt-income ratio of the
U.S. nonnancial sectors doubled between 1982 and 2008 (net credit
market assets as a ratio of GDP of these sectors fell from -1 to about
-2). A surge in net debt of this magnitude, which aected all three
nonnancial sectors (households, nonnancial businesses, and the gov-
ernment), is unprecedented in the data available since 1946.1
2. Starting in the mid 1980s, the integration of world capital markets that
resulted from the removal of capital controls and innovations in nan-
cial markets produced signicant changes in gross and net foreign asset
1Data is from the Flow of Funds of the Federal Reserve Board. Net credit is dened
as credit market assets minus credit market liabilities. Credit market assets and liabilities
exclude all non-debt nancial instruments, particularly equity holdings.
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3positions worldwide (see Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006)). In the United
States, both gross and net foreign borrowing rose sharply. Regarding
net foreign credit, about half of the increase in the net debt-income
ratio of the nonnancial sectors mentioned above was nanced by a
rise in net credit assets held by the rest of the world (see again the top
panel of Figure 1), and this was also an unprecedented phenomenon
in the post-war period. Before the mid 1980s, the U.S. tted well the
denition of nancial autarky: The net debt of the domestic nonnan-
cial sectors was almost identical to the net credit assets of the nancial
sector, with a zero net credit position for the rest of the world.2 In
terms of gross positions, the second panel of Figure 1 shows that the
foreign credit claims on U.S. nonnancial sectors grew sharply since
1985, while U.S. lending to foreigners (i.e. claims of the U.S. nonnan-
cial sectors on foreign agents) experienced a relatively modest increase.
As a result, net credit assets held by the rest of the world vis-a-vis the
United States grew by 50 percentage points of U.S. GDP since 1982.
3. The above trends identied in net credit assets are even more pro-
nounced for net total nancial assets and net Treasury securities, as
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. The plot shows the net asset
positions of the U.S. vis-a-vis the rest of the world as a ratio of the
corresponding net asset positions held by the domestic nonnancial
sectors for three asset categories: credit market assets (as in the top
two panels), total nancial assets (which include non-credit assets like
equity), and U.S. Treasury bills. The ratios for credit assets and total
nancial assets hover near zero before the mid 1980s, reecting again
the fact that before nancial globalization the U.S. was eectively in
nancial autarky. By the end of 2008, however, net credit assets held
by the rest of the world amounted to 1/5 of U.S. net credit liabilities
of the nonnancial sectors, and for total nancial assets the ratio was
even higher at about 1/3. For T-bills, the rest of the world increased
its positive net position sharply with the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system in the early 1970s, but even that increase dwarfs in comparison
2Note that the data for nancial sectors combines domestic and international compo-
nents, and hence it is not accurate to associate the nancial sectors data with domestic
nancial sectors. Before nancial integration, the international components were negligi-
ble, so the association was valid. After the mid 1980s, however, part of the rise in net
credit of nancial sectors reects also the eects of nancial globalization.
4with the surge observed since the mid 1980s. By 2008, the rest of the
world was a net holder of about one in every two T-bills held outside
of the U.S. nancial sectors.
The fact that a large fraction of the credit expansion experienced by the
U.S. economy was nanced by foreign borrowing raises several questions.
First, was the surge in debt in the United States a consequence of nancial
globalization? Second, if globalization led to higher U.S. leverages, did the
higher leverages make the current crisis worse for asset prices? Third, did
globalization strengthen the spillover eects of the crisis to other countries?
In order to address these issues, we start with a model that can ratio-
nalize both the expansion in domestic credit within the United States and
the growth of its liabilities, vis-a-vis the rest of the world, following nan-
cial integration. The model extends the framework of Mendoza, Quadrini,
& R os-Rull (2009) which has proven useful for explaining these two features
of the data. This new setup, however, diers in two important dimensions.
The rst dierence is that the model features three sets of economic agents
within each country: savers (or wage earners), producers (or capital owners),
and nancial intermediaries. In Mendoza et al. (2009) savers and producers
were merged in a single agent and nancial intermediaries were not explicitly
modeled. As we will see, the intermediation sector plays a central role in
the analysis of the current paper. The second dierence is that the analysis
conducted in Mendoza et al. (2009) is limited to steady states and transi-
tions from a steady state with nancial autarky to one with full nancial
integration. In this paper, instead, we focus on the eects of unanticipated
(and hence non-diversiable) shocks that hit the net worth of nancial inter-
mediaries.
In our model, savers receive endowment incomes that are subject to id-
iosyncratic shocks. They can trade state-contingent claims with nancial
intermediaries but there are constraints to the set of feasible claims. These
constraints derive from incentive-compatibility conditions imposed by limited
enforceability of nancial contracts, which diers across countries. Countries
with higher enforcement systems allow for better insurance of the idiosyn-
cratic risks and lower propensity to save. As a result, these countries tend
to accumulate negative net foreign asset positions.
Producers do not face idiosyncratic uncertainty, so eectively we assume
a representative producer. They also trade with nancial intermediaries
5and face limited enforcement of contracts, which takes the form of a collat-
eral constraint. Financial intermediaries raise funds from savers with state-
contingent deposits and make loans to producers. They own a xed amount
of physical capital and face a capital requirement that aects their ability
to intermediate funds from savers to producers. The capital requirement
is linked to the equity of the intermediaries valued at market prices (as in
mark-to-market accounting). The structure of the intermediation sector has
some similarities with Van-denHeuvel (2008).
The main simulation exercise we conduct in the paper consists in a `small'
unanticipated shock that reduces the value of banks' equity (by about 0.5
percent the value of world wide loans). This unanticipated shock induces a
large reduction in asset prices (almost 13 percent on impact). Moreover, it
takes a long period of time for asset prices to fully recover (about 12 years).
Since in a nancially integrated economy asset prices are global, this price
decline is the vehicle for international contagion of the nancial crisis. Asset
price declines are smaller than they would be in the presence of the same
shock under nancial autarky. This is precisely because the shock aects the
asset prices worldwide, and not just the country where the shock originated.
We then examine the quantitative eects of shifting from a capital require-
ment based on mark-to-market to a system based on historical prices. The
role played by mark-to-market accounting in the recent nancial crisis has
been widely debated. Because of this accounting principle, the recent asset
price drop has caused a large decline in the equity value of banks, impairing
their ability to make loans. This has led many academics and practitioners to
propose the suspension or adjustment of this principle given the widespread
nancial diculties (see, for example, the interviews with Robert Shiller and
James Chanos in the March 30, 2009 Wall Street Journal). Our results in-
dicate that, if the mark-to-market accounting was replaced with a system
based on historical prices, the response of asset prices to shocks aecting the
balance sheet of banks would be signicantly smaller.
The nancial mechanisms at work in our model are related to several
mechanisms studied in the literature on `credit channels' and `nancial ac-
celerators'. Classic references include Fisher (1933), Bernanke & Gertler
(1989) and Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). Meh & Moran (2008) extended this
class of models to an environment where bank capital plays a central role
in the transmission of monetary shocks. Gertler & Karadi (2009) exam-
ined the eects of government credit provision to distressed banks. Aguiar
& Drumond (2007), Drumond & Jorge (2008), Van-denHeuvel (2008) and
6Zhu (2007) also use models where the behavior of nancial intermediaries
is important for macroeconomic uctuations. Similar mechanisms, although
without an explicit modeling of the banking sector, have been used to study
Sudden Stops and nancial contagion in emerging economies during the 1990s
(see, for example, Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2001), Calvo (1998), Cook &
Devereux (2006), Gertler, Gilchrist, & Natalucci (2007), Mendoza & Smith
(2006), Mendoza (2008) and Paasche (2001)). Our work is also related to
the recent studies examining the implications of nancial integration among
countries that are heterogenous in the degree of domestic nancial develop-
ment (see Aoki, Benigno, & Kiyotaki (2007), Caballero, Farhi, & Gourinchas
(2008), Mendoza, Quadrini, & R os-Rull (2008), Mendoza et al. (2009) and
Prades & Rabitsch (2007)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the struc-
ture of the model. Section 3 explores the properties of the model numerically.
Section 4 examines the implications of changing the mark-to-market rule and
Section 5 conducts a sensitivity analysis. The nal Section 6 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
We extend the model studied in Mendoza et al. (2009) by adding a more
structured nancial intermediation sector. The goal is to study how the
behavior of nancial intermediaries in response to shocks to their balance
sheet propagate these shocks to the rest of the economy.
There are two countries, indexed by i 2 f1;2g, each inhabited by a con-
tinuum of agents of total mass i. Agents are of two types: producers and
savers, each of mass i=2. They all have the same preferences and maximize
the lifetime utility E
P1
t=0 tU(ct), where ct is consumption at time t and  is
the intertemporal discount factor. The utility function is strictly increasing
and concave with U(0) =  1 and U
000(c) > 0.
Each country is endowed with a xed per-capita supply  k of a non-
reproducible, internationally immobile asset, traded at price P i
t. This asset is
used in production as specied below. We now describe the specic aspects
of the two types of agents.
2.1 Savers
Savers are very similar to the agents described in Mendoza et al. (2009) ex-
cept that they do not have the managerial ability to generate income through
7the use of the productive asset. They receive income in the form of an id-
iosyncratic stochastic endowment wt, with a Markov conditional probability
distribution denoted by g(wt;wt+1). We also assume that the savers are
the shareholders of the nancial intermediaries from which they receive non-
negative dividends dt.
Savers can buy contingent claims, b(wt+1), that depend on the next pe-
riod's realizations of the endowment. In absence of aggregate uncertainty,




t is the equilibrium interest
rate.3 The budget constraint for an individual saver is:






Market incompleteness on the side of savers is modeled by assuming lim-
ited enforcement. Contracts are not perfectly enforceable due to the limited
(legal) veriability of shocks. Because of this, savers can divert part of their
endowment but they lose a fraction i of the diverted income. The parameter
i characterizes the degree of enforcement of nancial contracts in country
i. Appendix A shows that, under the assumptions that agents cannot be
excluded from nancial markets and there is limited liability, incentive com-
patibility imposes the following two constraints:






wj + b(wj)  0 (3)
for all j 2 f1;:::;Jg. Here J denotes the number of all possible realizations
of the endowment and w1 is the lowest (worst) realization.
The rst condition requires that insurance received through contingent
claims, b(w1)   b(wj), cannot be bigger than the variation in income, scaled
by i. When i is suciently large, savers are able to get full insurance of
idiosyncratic risk and maintain constant consumption. When i = 0, only
non-state-contingent claims are feasible. A key assumption is that i per-
tains to the country of residency of the savers. Cross-country dierences in
nancial development are captured by dierences in i. The second con-
straint derives from limited liability. The assumption is that a saver can
3The contingent claims are sold by competitive intermediaries as described below.
8always default on a contract at the beginning of next period. At this point
the intermediary can only recover the endowment wj.
Let fqi
(w;w+1)g1
=t be a (deterministic) sequence of prices in country
i. The optimization problem of an individual saver can be written as:
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i




















The solution to the saver's problem yields decision rules for consumption,
ci
t(w;b), and contingent claims, bi
t(w;b;w0). The decision rules determine
the evolution of the distribution of savers over w and b. The distribution is
denoted by Mi
t(w;b).
We show in Appendix B that, by properly redening the stochastic pro-
cess for the endowments, the problem can be reformulated as if each saver
chooses non-contingent claims, that is,
V
i
t (~ w; b) = max






















where ~ w is a transformation of w derived in the appendix and b is the expected
value of the contingent claims. The solution can then be characterized by
the rst order condition:
U




which is satised with equality if  b0 >   ~ w1.
2.2 Producers
Dierently from Mendoza et al. (2009), we assume that the owners and
users of the productive asset|the producers|are dierent from other agents
9(savers). This separation makes the model more tractable when we consider
unanticipated nancial shocks.
Producers receive a constant ow of endowment wp and generate income
yt+1 = F(kt+1) = Ak
t+1, where kt+1 is the quantity of the productive asset
purchased at time t. The parameter  is smaller than 1 because of limited
managerial capital that each producer has. Managerial capital is interna-
tionally mobile. Therefore, with capital mobility producers can choose to
operate at home, buying the domestic productive asset, or abroad, buying
the foreign productive asset. But they cannot do both. To keep the problem
simple we have deliberately assumed that producers do not face idiosyncratic
uncertainty neither in the endowment wp nor in production. Therefore, we
can focus on the representative producer.
As in the case of savers, producers can enter in contractual arrangements
with nancial intermediaries. Because producers do not face idiosyncratic
uncertainty, their nancial contracts are not state contingent. Denote by
lt+1=(1 + ri
t) the loan contracted with a nancial intermediary. In addition
to the interest rate, the bank also charges a nancial cost 'i
t(lt+1) which is
nonnegative, increasing and convex in the loan size. Therefore, the producer
receives the funds [lt+1   'i
t(lt+1)]=(1 + ri
t) at time t and promises to repay
lt+1 at t + 1. The precise nature of this cost will be specied later in the
description of the banking sector. We anticipate here that this cost will be
zero at steady state and it plays a role only in equilibria in which the equities
of the nancial intermediaries are low.
Limited enforcement constrains the amount that the intermediary is will-
ing to lend as follows:








This constraint derives from the assumption that the producer can always
default on a contract at the beginning of next period. At this point the
intermediary can only recover a fraction  i of the producer's assets, that is,
the market value of productive capital plus production. The parameter  i
could dier across countries which justies the superscript i.4
The producer starts the period with capital kt and liabilities lt and solves
4As we will see, the equilibrium interest rate is usually lower than the intertemporal
discount rate due to the precautionary motive of savers. Because of this, producers have
an incentive to borrow as much as possible. The above enforcement constraint makes sure
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which is subject to the budget and enforcement constraints.




=t, the solution is


























where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint
(7). The multiplier is positive if the constraint is binding.
Assuming that all producers in each country start with the same initial
states, k and l, they all choose the same productive asset, k0, and next period
liabilities, l0, and they enter the next period with the same states. Condi-
tions (9) and (10), together with the budget and enforcement constraints,
determine the whole sequence of consumption for a given sequence of prices.
Of course, prices must satisfy the general equilibrium conditions that we will
describe below.
It is interesting to notice that conditions (9) and (10) imply that there
is an equity premium in the accumulation of productive assets. Because the
term 'i
t;d(:) is nonnegative, the parameter restriction  i < 1 implies that the
return from the productive asset is bigger than the interest rate. Thus, asset
prices are lower than in the absence of the enforcement constraint.5 As we will
see, this feature will play an important role in characterizing the composition
5Mendoza (2008) derives a similar result in a small open economy model with a collat-
eral constraint on foreign borrowing.
11of the net asset positions of dierent countries when the international capital
markets are liberalized.
2.3 Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are prot maximizing rms owned by savers. They
sign nancial contracts with savers and producers. We assume that nancial
intermediaries own a xed quantity  kf of the economy's productive capital.
We think of  kf as the physical capital that is necessary to run the intermedia-
tion activity. For simplicity, this capital is assumed to be in the balance sheet
of the intermediary but it does not generate any income directly. What is
important for our analysis is that the balance sheet of nancial intermediaries
depends on the market price of the asset.6
Financial intermediaries start the period with real assets  kf, a stock of
loans made in the previous period to producers, Lt, and deposits from savers,
Bt. The deposits are given by the value of all contingent claims purchased









where the subscript  1 denotes variables known in the previous period. In
writing this expression we are assuming that each intermediary diversies
perfectly the claims purchased by workers. The beginning-of-period equity
of the nancial intermediaries is equal to:
et =  k
fP
i
t + Lt   Bt (11)
Given the beginning of period equity, the nancial intermediary raises
new deposits, makes new loans and pay dividends to shareholders (savers).














6The assumption that nancial intermediaries choose to keep the productive asset even
if it does not generate income is ad hoc. In fact, because the productive asset has a market
value, intermediaries would be better o selling them and closing down operations. Of
course, there are ways to enrich the model to make the holding of  kf from intermediaries
fully rational. However, we decided to impose this by assumption to keep the analysis as
simple as possible. All we want to get is that the market price of the productive asset is
going to aect the equity of the bank.
12The left-hand-side includes the source of funds, equity plus deposits. The
right-hand-side is the use of funds, productive asset plus loans and dividends.
So far, the description of the intermediation sector is standard, except for
the assumption that intermediaries own  kf. We now introduce some frictions
that will make the intermediation sector central to the analysis.
The rst assumption is that intermediaries cannot issue new shares. This
simply means that dividends cannot be negative, that is, dt  0.
The second assumption is that banks can issue two types of loans. The
rst type of loans are subject to a capital requirement, that is, they must be
backed by bank equities. The second type of loans are not subject to this
requirement but imply an extra cost.
Denote by  Lt+1 the stock of loans that are subject to the capital require-
ment. On this stock the bank faces the following constraint:
 Lt+1  (et   dt) (13)
where  > 1. The constraint imposes that this type of loans cannot be bigger
than a multiple of the bank equity after the payment of dividends. Next we
have to specify how  Lt+1 is determined.
Denote by lt+1 the total loan made to an individual producer. Part of
this loan,  lt+1, is of the rst type, and therefore, it is subject to capital
requirement. The remaining part of the loan, lt+1    lt+1, is of the second
type and it is not subject to the capital requirement. However, in order to
exempt the loan from the capital requirement the intermediary has to incur
the cost (lt+1    lt+1)2. This cost can be interpreted as resources used by
the bank to improve the risk standard of the loan (so that it is exempted
from capital requirement) and/or to sell part of the loan directly to savers
through securitization. Notice that the quadratic cost has to be incurrent on
each individual loan.
The banking sector is competitive. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium,










t, the cost of the loan for a producer is the interest rate. Above i
t,
the bank also charges a convex cost on top of the interest rate.
13Because of competition, banks minimize the cost charged to each cos-
tumer. This is obtained by choosing the largest i
t compatible with the
owned equity. Compatibility here means that, in equilibrium, the total stock
of loans made by banks subject to the capital requirement does not violate
constraint (13). The largest i
t is obtained when banks pay no dividend. In
equilibrium, all banks choose the same i
t = ( kfPt+Lt Bt) = et. In other
words, banks choose the threshold that in equilibrium is equal to the capital
requirement if they pay no dividend. Therefore, if the demand for loans does
not exceed the maximum capacity of the banking sector for capital-backed
loans (that is, the loans that the banking sector can make without incurring
the extra cost when it pays zero dividends), the borrowing cost for producers
is only the interest rate ri
t. However, if the demand exceeds the maximum
loans that can be backed by bank capital, banks will charge the additional
nancial cost.
The threshold i
t is essentially an equilibrium price which, together with
the interest rate ri
t, dene the terms of the loan contract oered to producers
in country i. Both i
t and ri
t are determined in equilibrium to clear the
market. Given symmetry, the total per-capita loans made by banks are




Lt+1 =  Lt+1 if lt+1  i
t
Lt+1 >  Lt+1 if lt+1 > i
t
Banks take as given the pricing schedule for loans, that is, they take as
given i
t and ri
t since they are determined by competitive forces. Because the
net return on loans is simply the interest rate ri
t, the problem solved by the





























where the constraint is obtained by eliminating et in equation (12) using
equation (11).
14Notice that the cost 'i
t(:) does not enter the budget constraint because
it is ultimately paid by the borrower. The capital requirement is implicit
in the pricing variable i
t. The discount rate for a nancial intermediary is
the relevant discount rate for its shareholders, that is, the savers. Under the
assumption that there is no aggregate uncertainty, this is the interest rate.
It is easy to see that the dividend policy of an individual intermediary
is undetermined. Because the discount rate is the interest rate, the inter-
mediary is indierent at the margin in the use of equity or deposits in the
nancing of loans. Given the indeterminacy, we assume that when the cap-
ital requirement is not binding, that is, banks can satisfy the total demand
of loans without paying any nancial cost, they distribute with dividends
all the equities in excess of the capital requirement. The relevance of this
assumption will be discussed below.
2.4 Unexpected shock to the balance sheet of banks
Starting from a steady state equilibrium, we consider a one-time, unantic-
ipated shock that reduces the equity of the nancial intermediaries. This
could be caused by an unexpected loss in some of the loans made to produc-
ers (because, for instance, some producers default on their debt). Alterna-
tively we can think of this shock as an unexpected physical depreciation in
 kf. It is important to stress that the shock is unanticipated and arises only
once. Thus, the economy will experience transition dynamics that are fully
deterministic and will converge back to the initial steady state. The exact
nature of the experiment will be described in the quantitative section.
The assumed dividend policy of the nancial intermediaries plays a crucial
role in characterizing the transition dynamics. Before the arrival of the unan-
ticipated shock, intermediaries have minimized their stock of equity up to the
point in which the capital requirement is satised with equality. This has
been imposed by assumption given the indeterminacy of the dividend policy.
Therefore, if the shock is suciently large, intermediaries become unable to
full the capital requirement. The inability to issue new shares (non-negative
dividends) implies that banks cannot rebuild their equity quickly by cutting
dividends. Thus, they are forced to lower i
t and charge a positive nancial
cost 'i
t(:).
It is helpful to provide a graphical illustration of the market for loans
and how it is aected by this shock. Figure 2 plots the demand for loans
from producers (which is downward sloping in the cost of borrowing) and the
15supply from banks (which is horizontal until the capital requirement binds
given the bank's equity). The supply is plotted for a given interest rate,
before and after the shock. Before the shock, the economy is at the steady
state, with the equilibrium marginal cost of borrowing equal to the interest





















Figure 2: Equilibrium in the market for loans for a given interest rate.
After the shock, the maximum amount of loans that can be backed by
bank equity shrinks to  LAfter. Even if banks pay zero dividends, this is
the maximum volume of loans that banks can make without incurring a
cost. Anything above is oered at an increasing price. As a result of the
new intersection between loan demand and supply, the equilibrium cost of
borrowing increases and the volume of loans declines. Because banks cut
lending, however, they demand less deposits from savers and the interest rate
declines from ri
Before to ri
After. Thus, the spread between the marginal cost
of borrowing and the interest rate on deposits widens. Even if the interest
rate declines, the marginal cost of borrowing is higher than in the pre-shock
equilibrium. The marginal cost of borrowing is what matters for asset prices
as can be seen from equations (9)-(10). It is the increase in this cost that
generates an asset price crash.7
The fall in the price of assets generates a further deterioration in the
balance sheet of banks. As a result, in the general equilibrium of the model
7In the nal equilibrium the demand for loans from producers also shifts, generating a
further declines in borrowing. We have ignored this shift to simplify the discussion.
16 LAfter shifts even further to the left inducing a larger credit contraction and a
larger drop in prices. This is the driving force of the amplication generated
by the banking sector. This mechanism is akin to the Fisherian debt-deation
mechanism and the nancial accelerator emphasized in models without an
explicit nancial intermediation sector. With the explicit modeling of the
intermediation sector, the mechanism becomes more powerful because banks
are much more leveraged than non-nancial businesses.
2.5 General equilibrium
We have already provided an informal description of the equilibrium. Here we
provide a formal denition. We start with the environment without mobility
of capital (nancial autarky). We will then describe how the denition can
be adjusted for the case with capital mobility.
The sucient aggregate states are given by the distribution of savers,
Mi
t(w;b), the liabilities of producers, Li
t, and the stock of productive capital
owned by producers, Ki
t. Knowing the distribution of savers and the loans
made by banks, we can determine the net worth of producers and the equities
of banks (once the equilibrium price of the productive asset is determined).
We have the following denition:
Denition 1 (Financial autarky) Given the nancial development param-
eters, i and  i, initial distributions of savers, Mi
t(w;b), banks' loans, Li
t,
productive capital owned by producers, Ki
t, for i 2 f1;2g, an equilibrium
without international mobility of capital is dened by sequences of: (i) savers'
policies, fbi
(w;b;w0)g1

















=t; (v) distributions fMi
(w;k;b)g1
=t+1. Such
that: (i) the policy rules solve problems (4), (8) and (14); (ii) prices are
competitive and satisfy i
 = ( kfP i
t + Lt   Bt) and qi
 = g(w;w0)=(1 + ri
t);







(K;L)=2 =  k    kf for each i 2 f1;2g and   t; (iv) the sequence of dis-
tributions of savers is consistent with the initial distributions, the individual
policies and the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic shocks.
The denition of the equilibrium with globally integrated capital markets
is similar, except for the prices and market clearing conditions (ii) and (iii).
With nancial integration there is a global market for assets and asset prices




 = g(w;w0)=(1 + r1
t) = g(w;w0)=(1 + r2
t) = q2
 and P 1
 = P 2
 . Further-
more, asset markets clear globally instead of country by country. Hence, the















In this section we study the model's quantitative predictions regarding the
eects of nancial integration and shocks to the balance sheet of banks. The
parameter values are set as follows. We interpret the rst country as the
United States and the second country as the rest of the world. Therefore,
we calibrate the model so that the economic size of the US is 30 percent the
size of the world economy. This is obtained by assuming that the population
size of the rst country is 1 = 0:3.8
Preferences take the logarithmic form U(c) = log(c). The intertemporal
discount rate is set to  = 0:94.
We interpret the endowments as labor income and the returns from pro-
ductive assets as capital income. Based on this interpretation we set average
per-capita endowment,  w+wp, to 0.8 and the income generated with produc-
tive assets to y = Ak = 0:2. Given the normalization k = 1 this is obtained
by setting A = 0:2. Notice that the capital income is only 20 percent (and
correspondingly the labor income is 80 percent) because this is net of depre-
ciation. The return-to-scale parameter is set to 0.75. The total endowment
is split equally between producers and savers, that is,  w = wp = 0:4.
The stochastic endowment of savers takes two values, w =  w(1  w),
with symmetric transition probability matrix. We follow recent estimates
of the U.S. earnings process and set the persistence probability to 0:95 and
w = 0:6.
Next we choose the parameters of the nancial structure. These are the
parameters 1, 2,  1 and  2, where the superscript denotes the country. For
the parameters 1 and 2, what matters is the dierence not the absolute
8There are two ways to impose dierent economic sizes of the two countries: by dier-
entiating the population size and/or the per-capita quantities (endowment and productive
asset). However, what matters for the quantitative results is the total economic size of the
country, not the sources of the size dierences. Therefore, to simplify the presentation we
have assumed that countries only dier in population size.
18values. Therefore, we set 2 = 0. We are then left with three parameters.
Their values are chosen to replicate the following targets in the steady state
equilibrium with capital mobility:
1. Domestic credit in country 1 (the US) is 195 percent the value of do-
mestic output.
2. Domestic credit in country 2 (the Rest of the World) is 119 percent the
value of domestic output.
3. The net foreign asset position of country 1 (the US) is 30 percent the
value of domestic output.
These numbers come from the 2005 World Development Indicators. The
Rest of the World includes OECD countries (except the US) and emerging
economies. The parameters that generate these targets are: 1 = 0:21,
 1 = 0:62 and  2 = 0:45.
At this point we are left with the parameters characterizing the inter-
mediation sector. These parameters do not aect the steady state targets
imposed above, and therefore, they can be set independently. The parameter
determining the cost of loans  is not important for the equilibrium outside
the steady state and its value will be specied below. The per-capita endow-
ment of the productive asset is set to  k = 1:05 and the one held by nancial
intermediaries is kf = 0:05. Therefore, the stock of productive assets owned
by nancial intermediaries is only 5 percent of the stock owned by the rest
of the economy. The capital requirement for loans is set to  = 10. This
implies that loans must be backed by 10 percent of equity.9
We should emphasize that the parameters of the intermediation sector
(,  kf and ) are not pinned down using precise calibration targets since
it is dicult to identify these targets empirically. Therefore, although the
results we show in the next sections provide helpful information about the
quantitative potential of the model, they should be taken with caution.
3.1 Steady state properties and long-term eects of capital liber-
alization
In this section we show that the model generates an increase in leverages in
the most nancially developed country (country 1) as a result of nancial
9For comparison, the Basle II accord sets a risk-weighted capital requirement on com-
mercial banks equal to 8 percent of their assets.
19liberalization. This provides an answer to the rst question asked in the
Introduction: did the globalization of nancial markets lead to higher US
borrowing? The key statistics showing the result are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Statistics for nancial variables in steady states with and without
mobility of capital.
Country 1 Country 2
Autarky Mobility Autarky Mobility
Interest rate 4.31 3.92 3.67 3.92
Price productive asset 3.21 3.28 3.30 3.28
Total domestic credit 169 195 126 119
Foreign position in productive assets - 34 - -15
Foreign borrowing - 64 - -27
Net Foreign asset position - -30 - 12
Note: Financial variables are in percentage of domestic output.
Before looking at the various asset positions with and without nancial
integration, let's look at the equilibrium interest rates. In both countries and
in both nancial regimes, the interest rates are smaller than the intertempo-
ral discount rate 1=   1  0:06. This is the consequence of precautionary
savings from savers who face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. Because pro-
ducers do not face any uncertainty (absence of precautionary motives), the
low interest rate implies that they will borrow as much as possible. Therefore,
the borrowing limit (7) is binding.
We can now look at the stock positions of the two countries. In the steady
state without capital mobility (autarky), the domestic credit of country 1 is
169 percent the value of domestic output while in the steady state with
nancial integration this is 195 percent.10 Therefore, the model predicts
that capital markets liberalization has contributed to an increase in domestic
credit of 26 percentage points the value of domestic output. In country 2,
instead, capital liberalization has generated a decline in domestic credit of 7
percentage points.
10Domestic credit is the sum of loans taken by producers plus the net worth of savers if
this is negative. Because the value of the contingent claims can be negative, some savers
are actually borrowing. However, the debt of savers is small in aggregate.
20Capital liberalization has also induced country 1 to accumulate a posi-
tive net position in the productive asset of 34 percent the value of domestic
output.This is associated to an increase in foreign borrowing of 64 percent.11
Therefore, after capital markets liberalization, the net foreign asset position
of country 1 reaches the long-term value of minus 30 percent.
The mechanism leading to these changes can be explained as follows.
As can be seen from Table 1, in the pre-liberalization equilibrium country
1 has a higher interest rate and a lower price of the productive asset than
country 2. Prices equalize after liberalization. Therefore, in country 1 the
interest rate declines and the price of the productive asset increases. This
allows producers in country 1 to increase borrowing since the higher price
of the productive asset increases the value of the collateral. At the same
time, because producers in country 1 face enforcement constraints that are
less tight than in country 2, that is,  1 >  2, we can see from condition (10)
that they require a lower return on the productive asset compared with the
return required by producers in country 2. The concavity of the production
function then implies that producers in country 1 operate larger scales. This
contributes to the positive position of country 1 in the productive asset.
To understand the negative net foreign asset position, we have to consider
the role played by savers. Because the interest rate in country 1 declines while
in country 2 increases (compared to the autarky equilibrium), savers decrease
their savings in country 1 and save more in country 2. As a result, a large
fraction of borrowing from producers is nanced by foreign savers through
the banking system.
To summarize, the model captures the fact that capital liberalization
has contributed to generating a signicant amount of foreign borrowing for
country 1, the US. The increase in borrowing induced by capital markets
liberalization is in the order of 64 percent the value of domestic income.
11The net foreign position in the productive asset is the dierence between the total
productive assets owned by domestic producers and the domestic endowment of the asset,
 k, multiplied by the market price Pi
t. Foreign borrowing is the dierence between domestic
credit, dened in the previous footnote, and the total loans made by domestic banks, that
is, loans nanced by the `positive' claims of domestic savers and the equities of domestic
banks.
213.2 Shock to bank equity and the short-term eects of capital
liberalization
In this section we address the second and third questions asked in the In-
troduction: Did the higher US leverages induced by globalization make the
current crisis worse? Did globalization allow the crisis to spread to other
countries?
In order to address these two questions we have to specify the driving
force behind the recent crisis. Although the events leading to the crisis are
complex and connecting the causes of these events to only one factor provides
an incomplete picture, there is no doubt that the balance sheet deterioration
of nancial intermediaries played an important role. Therefore, we consider
a shock that decreases the equities of banks by a certain percentage of out-
standing loans. This can be interpreted as unexpected losses due to unre-
coverable loans made to producers. The goal of the paper is to understand
the consequences of these losses.
We consider a shock that generates a loss of bank equity in country 1
of 0.5 percent the value of worldwide loans. This is equivalent to about
1.5 percent the value of loans made in country 1. We start by studying
the impulse responses of asset prices which are reported in Figure 3 for the
economies with and without international mobility of capital.
Consider rst the regime with capital mobility. As shown by the continu-
ous line, the shock generates an initial drop in the price of assets of about 13
percent. In considering the transition dynamics, the cost of avoiding bank
capital requirement plays an important role. This is captured by the param-
eter , which in the simulation is set to 0.1. As banks become unable to full
the whole demand of loans without violating the capital requirement, they
start charging the additional nancial cost. Higher values of  increase this
cost more rapidly and induce a larger drop in the demand for loans. This,
in turn, generates a larger drop in asset prices.12
Figure 4 plots the impulse responses for other variables (in levels) but
only in the case with capital mobility. The interest rate drops as banks
demand less deposits from savers in response to the reduction in the demand
of loans. The demand of loans decreases because of the higher marginal cost
of loans for producers, the ratio (1+ri
t)=(1 'i
t;l(lt+1)). The total volume of
loans made by banks contracts signicantly and, as a result, producers cut
12As we increase , the response of asset prices becomes larger. However, for very large
values of  we are unable to solve for the transition dynamics.
22Figure 3: Impulse response of asset prices to an unanticipated shock to bank
equities. Economy with and without mobility of capital.
their consumption initially.
Next we consider the asset price response to the same shock but in the
regime without mobility of capital. As before, the shock derives from losses
made on country 1 loans. In the environment with mobility of capital it
does not matter whether the losses come from loans made in country 1 or
country 2. With capital mobility, in fact, rms can borrow indistinguishably
from domestic and foreign banks. Therefore, what matters is the worldwide
lending capacity of the whole banking sector. In the regime without capital
mobility, however, whether the losses are in country 1 or 2 matters. Only the
country in which the losses are materialized faces the type of consequences
shown in Figure 3 by the dashed line. Comparing the economies with and
without mobility of capital, we observe that the response of asset prices is
much bigger in the autarky regime.
Why is the asset price drop bigger in the autarky regime? The key to
the answer is the fact that globalization creates larger nancial markets.
While in a closed economy borrowing is limited to the funds supplied by
23Figure 4: Impulse response of asset prices to an unanticipated shock to bank
equities. Economy with mobility of capital.
24domestic intermediaries, in a globalized economy producers can also borrow
from foreign intermediaries. As a result, in a globalized world the credit
contraction and the impact on aggregate prices are spread among all countries
that are nancially integrated. The eect on country 1 is then smaller.
This nding seems to provide a negative answer to the question of whether
globalization made the crisis worse for the United States. More specically,
the simulation exercise suggests that the crisis could have been much worse if
the US economy was not nancially integrated in the world nancial market.
However, this is an incomplete thought because it misses the fact (which is
consistent with the model) that leverage in the U.S. economy rose sharply
because of nancial integration. Without nancial integration, the economy
would have been less leveraged (as shown in the previous section), and hence
the aggregate volume of loans would have been smaller. Consequently, it
would have been possible that the losses incurred by nancial institutions
and/or their likelihood were smaller. If we assume that the losses for the
banking sector are proportional to the stock of loans, then it is true that
the initial losses for banks in country 1 are smaller given the lower leverage.
However, the response of asset prices would still be higher than in the regime
with capital mobility. We will come back to this point in Section 5.
The results shown in Figures 3 and 4 also provide an answer to the ques-
tion of whether globalization allowed the crisis to spill over other countries.
Here the model provides a clear answer: Although the impact on the originat-
ing country is smaller (as discussed above), other countries will be aected
by the shock even if the shock originated abroad. Therefore, with globalized
markets, country-specic shocks propagate to other economies inducing a
worldwide drop in asset prices.
4 Mark-to-market accounting
In this Section we explore how changes in the accounting principle used to
value assets in the banks' balance sheet modies the response of the model
to the initial nancial shock. In the previous simulations we assumed that
the `equity' of nancial intermediaries relevant for the capital requirement
was determined by valuing assets at market prices. More specically, capital
was valued at price Pt. Therefore, we assumed a mark-to-market approach.
We now consider an alternative scenario in which the banks' assets are
valued at historical prices for the purpose of capital requirement, that is, for
the application of the constraint  Lt+1  (et dt). In our context this means
25that in order to calculate the value of bank equities, the asset  kf continues
to be valued at the steady state price  P even if the market price changes.
Using (12), the capital requirement can also be expressed as:
 Lt+1  
 
 k









The impulse responses of asset prices under mark-to-market and mark-to-
historical-price are shown in Figure 5. The initial drop in the market price of
assets is now about 7 percent, which is signicantly smaller than the 13 drop
generated in the previous case. The changes in all the remaining variables
plotted in Figure 4 are also smaller when the capital requirement is assessed
using historical prices.
Figure 5: Impulse response of asset prices to an unanticipated shock to bank
equities. Economy with mobility of capital under mark-to-market and his-
torical prices.
The intuition for this result is simple. Even if there is a drop in the
market price of assets, the `book value' of equities does not fall and this allows
nancial intermediaries to maintain higher levels of loans without incurring
26an additional nancial cost. On the other hand, when the bank equities are
valued at market prices, a drop in Pt generates a drop in et which reduces the
banks' ability to make loans subject to capital requirement. If the drop in
Pt is small, banks may not be forced to cut lending because they can reduce
dividends. If the drop is large, the non-negativity of dividends binds and
banks are forced to charge high lending costs.
5 Sensitivity
What is the incidence of the capital requirement for banks? In our model this
is captured by the parameter . To show the sensitivity of the results to this
parameter, Figure 6 plots the impulse response of asset prices when  = 9,
which implies a capital requirement of 11.1 percent of equity (compared with
 = 10, or 10 percent of equity, in the baseline calibration). As can be seen,
a lower value of , that is, a stricter capital requirement for banks, reduces
the impact of the shock on asset prices. This is because with a higher capital
requirement, the fall in bank equity induces a smaller reduction in the supply
of loans that need to be backed by bank capital. Because of this, the marginal
cost of borrowing increases less and the impact on prices is lower.
Figure 6 also plots the impulse response when country 2 has the same
characteristics of country 1. More specically, the nancial parameters  and
  of country 2 are set to the same values assigned to country 1 in the baseline
calibration. This implies that, nancial liberalization does not induce an
increase in leverage in neither of the two countries. Therefore, comparing
this impulse response to the response for the baseline model allows us to
decompose in two factors the importance of capital markets liberalization for
country 1 (the US): the ability to access a larger market and the formation
of higher leverages.
As can be seen from the gure, the impact of the shock on asset prices
is smaller when country 2 is as nancially developed as country 1. This is
because country 1 is now less leveraged (thus, the initial losses for banks
are smaller) and the bank capital in country 2 is larger (since producers in
the second country can borrow more). This eect, however, is more than
compensated by the fact that country 1 can now access a larger market.
Comparing the impulse response with that plotted in Figure 3, we observe
that the asset price drop is much bigger in autarky even if the leverage of
country 1 does not change in response to capital markets integration.
Another important observation that follows from these results is that
27Figure 6: Impulse response of asset prices to an unanticipated shock to bank
equities in the economy with mobility of capital. Sensitivity to  and cross-
country heterogeneity.
nancial globalization in the presence of dierences in domestic nancial de-
velopment not only accounts for the surge in debt in country 1, it also implies
much larger amplication and global transmission in the response of asset
prices to small, unanticipated shocks to banks' capital. Hence, this nd-
ing suggests that nancial globalization among countries with heterogeneous
nancial markets has made the crisis worse.
6 Conclusion
Financial integration among countries that dier in domestic nancial devel-
opment produces a signicant increase in net credit for the most nancially
developed country. In this paper we examined the connection between this
phenomenon, the eects of shocks to bank equities on asset prices, and the
cross-country contagion of nancial turbulence.
We proposed a setup in which nancial constraints induced by limited
28enforcement aect the nancial positions of savers, producers and nancial
intermediaries. The model also captures the mark-to-market rules for nan-
cial intermediaries that have been at play in the recent crisis.
Cross-country dierences in enforcement create the conditions for nan-
cial integration to generate a surge in debt in the most nancially developed
country. Thus, the model captures the fact that the United States have ex-
perienced a large increase in leverage during the last two decades, largely
nanced by foreign lending. Moreover, the model predicts that relatively
small shocks to the equity of one country's nancial intermediaries produce
large responses in equilibrium asset prices world wide. Thus, the model can
explain large asset price declines and global contagion in asset prices.
Replacing the accounting principle of mark-to-market for bank capital
valuation based on historical prices reduces the magnitude of the asset price
declines induced by shocks to the balance sheet of banks. Hence, our model
lends support to the view that the mark-to-market principle should be re-
placed with a more exible rule or at least discontinued in times of nancial
turbulence. Of course, the same outcome can also be reached by keeping the
mark-to-market principle but relaxing the constraint on capital requirement.
This conclusion should be taken with caution since our model abstracts from
frictions that are often used to defend mark-to-market accounting, such as
moral hazard problems on the part of bank managers.
29A Appendix: Set of feasible contingent claims
Suppose that agents have the ability to divert part of their income. Diversion
is observable but not veriable in a legal sense. If an agent diverts x, he or
she retains (1   )x while the remaining part, x, is lost. We allow  to be
greater than 1. This can be interpreted as a ne or additional punishment.
A similar assumption is made in Castro, Clementi, & MacDonald (2004) but
in an environment with information asymmetry.
Contracts are signed with nancial intermediaries in a competitive en-
vironment. Financial contracts are not exclusive, meaning that agents can
always switch to another intermediary from one period to the other. The set
of state-contingent claims that an intermediary is willing to oer must be
incentive-compatible.
Let Vt(w;b) be the value function for an agent with current realization of
endowment w and non-endowment wealth b. After choosing the contingent
claims b(wj), the next period value is Vt(wj;b(wj)). In case of diversion, the
agent would claim that the realizations of the endowment was the lowest
level w1 and divert the dierence wj   w1. In this process the agent retains
(1   )(wj   w1) and receives b(s1). The non-endowment wealth would be
~ b(wj) = b(w1)   (wj   w1) and the value of diversion is:
Vt










wj ; b(w1)     (wj   w1)

which must hold for all j = 1;::;N.
It is important to emphasize that the nancial intermediary can tell
whether the agent is diverting but there is no court that can verify this and
force the repayment of the diverted funds. Compared to the standard model
with information asymmetries, this assumption is convenient because it sim-
plies the contracting problem when shocks are persistent. Also convenient
is the assumption that nancial contracts are not exclusive and agents can
switch to other intermediaries without a cost. This further limits the pun-
ishments available to the current intermediary. Also notice that, although
the new level of wealth after diversion is veriable when a new contract is
30signed, this does not allow the verication of diversion because the addi-
tional resources could derive from lower consumption in previous periods,
which is not observable and veriable. Again, the intermediary knows that
the additional resources come from diversion but it cannot legally prove it.
The last assumption is limited liability for which agents renegotiate nega-
tive values of net worth, and therefore, wj +b(wj)  0. The agent's problem





























wj ; b(w1)     (wj   w1)

wj + b(wj)  0
Using standard arguments for recursive problems, we can prove that there
is a unique solution and the function Vt(w;b) is strictly increasing and concave
in b. The strict monotonicity of the value function implies that the incentive-
compatibility constraint can be written as:
b(wj)  b(w1)     (wj   w1)
for all j = 1;::;N. This is the constraint we imposed on the original problem.
B Appendix: Equivalent economy
Let  bt be the expected next period value of contingent claims, that is,  bt =
P
wt+1 b(wt+1)g(wt;wt+1). Then a contingent claim can be rewritten as b(wt+1) =
 bt+x(wt+1) where, by denition,
P
wt+1 x(wt+1)g(wt;wt+1) = 0. The variable
 bt can be interpreted as a non-contingent bond and the variable x(wt+1) is
the pure insurance component of contingent claims.
Because agents choose as much insurance as possible, the constraint for
incentive-compatibility will be satised with equality, that is,
b(w1)   b(wj) =   (wj   w1)
31Using b(wt+1) =  bt + x(wt+1), the constraint can be rewritten as:
x(w1)   x(wj) =   (wj   w1)
which must hold for all j > 1. The variables x(sj) must also satisfy the




Therefore, we have N conditions and N unknowns. We can then solve for
all the N values of x. The solution can be written as:
x(wj) =    Wj(wt)
where Wj(wt) is an exogenous variable dened as Wj(wt) = wj 
P
i g(wt;wi)wi.
Notice that this variable depends on the current shock which aects the prob-
ability distribution of next period shock.
Dene the following variable:
~ wj(wt) = wj     Wj(wt)
This is a transformation of the shock. Using this new shock, the budget
constraint can be written as:
dt + ~ wj(wt) + btx = ct +
 bt+1
1 + rt
By redening the endowment to be ~ wj(wt), it is as if agents choose non
contingent claims  bt. Dierences in nancial deepness are captured by dier-
ence in the stochastic properties of the transformed shock. So, for example,
if  = 0, we go back to the original shock because contingent claims are
not feasible. If  = 1 and shocks are iid, the transformed shock becomes a
constant. We are in the case of full insurance. Any intermediate values allow
only for partial insurance.
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